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The title of this panel is “The Weight of Burdens: Decision Thresholds 
and how to get ordinary people to operationalize them the way we want them 
to.”  I am a somewhat odd choice to be answering that question, since, apart 
from a few aberrational efforts during my misbegotten youth1 when I was 
not thinking clearly about the distinction between normative and positive 
work, my research program is as positive as I can make it.  The closest to 
this title that an aspect of my research program attempts to shed light on is 
the question of the nature of juridical proof rather than what it should be or 
how do we get jurors to act in one way or another.  To be sure, once one has 
a confident grasp of the answer to that question, normative proselytizing can 
begin, by those who wish to do it, either to enhance or modify the structure 
in place—but that is not a serious motivation of my work.  I cheerily assume 
that, generally speaking (a point soon to be developed further), fact finders 
(judges are no different from jurors) do exactly what we ask them to do, 
which is to determine to their best ability what actually happened concerning 
a litigated event, and apply the law as they understand it to the facts that are 
found.2  For me, one of the interesting questions is the extent to which the 
 
* John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law; 
President, International Association of Evidence and Forensic Science; Fellow, The Forensic 
Science Institute, China University of Political Science and Law. 
 1  References provided on request. 
 2  This cheery assumption received considerable vindication from the Arizona Jury 
Project.  The authors summarize the empirical data: 
 
The conventional wisdom on jury comprehension of legal instructions 
is only partially correct: juries do struggle with jury instructions, and 
they sometimes misapply legal rules in reaching their verdicts.  With 
some important exceptions, however, the deliberations of the Arizona 
jurors as they discussed legal issues were remarkably consistent with 
the instructions they received.  Moreover, the evidence presented here 
shows that deliberations do assist in resolving individual 
misunderstandings.  The jurors in Arizona, armed with individual 
copies of the jury instructions, were able to correct nearly half of the 
errors made during their deliberations. 
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American legal system facilitates or retards that effort, and with what costs 
and benefits, rather than how we get “them” to do what we want them to do.  
That question leads in turn to my major research program on the nature of 
juridical proof.3 
In analyzing the question of the nature of juridical proof, the evidence 
literature spends an inordinate amount of effort on burdens of proof and the 
so-called proof paradoxes such as the conjunction effect.  I bear some 
responsibility for this, having once also looked at the problem through that 
lens.4  Although that early literature was interesting and helpful in many 
respects, in my opinion the fascination with the proof paradoxes, and thus 
the burden of proof, has become unproductive.  It continues to generate what 
Kevin Clermont refers to as “contortions,”5 of which I will show his is a 
prime example, in order to explain away something that cannot be explained 
away.  The conjunction effect is a feature of the world; it is not a feature of 
our explanation of the world.  If more than one conclusion needs to be 
reached to decide some issue (whatever it is), and if a false positive on any 
would render a mistaken decision, then errors will accumulate as a function 
of errors on those discrete conclusions.  Simple as that.  One can pretend this 
does not exist and/or its consequences are trivial,6 accept it and move on,7 or 
wish it away apparently from the belief that changing one’s views of 





Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The “Kettleful Of Law” In Real Jury 
Deliberations: Successes, Failures, And Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1605 (2012).  
Moreover, some of the “errors” were actually deliberate forms of jury nullification, which the 
authors call “resistance errors.”  Id. at 1601.  
 3  See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 
373–422 (1991); Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof: Probability as a Tool in 
Plausible Reasoning, 21 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 133, 133–42 (2017).  
 4  Of the many sources of evidence for this sin, see Ronald J. Allen, A 
Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401, 401–37 (1986).   
 5  Kevin M. Clermont, Common Sense on Standards of Proof (Cornell Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 17-37, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007129.  Ronald J. Allen & 
Michael S. Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 
(forthcoming 2019) (providing a thorough discussion of this and other competitors of the 
relative plausibility theory).  
 6  See David S. Schwartz & Elliott Sober, The Conjunctions Problem and the Logic of 
Jury Findings, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619 (2017).   
 7  See DALE A. NANCE, THE BURDENS OF PROOF: DISCRIMINATORY POWER, WEIGHT OF 
EVIDENCE, AND TENACITY OF BELIEF (2016); Mark Spottswood, Unraveling the Conjunction 
Paradox, 15 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 259 (2016).  
 8  See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, STANDARDS OF DECISION IN LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND 
LOGICAL BASES FOR THE STANDARD OF PROOF, HERE AND ABROAD (2013).  
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One reason for the continued fascination with burdens of proof is the 
belief that the conjunction effect is the biggest obstacle to a robust 
probabilistic interpretation of juridical proof, and again I bear some 
responsibility for this, for which I would like to publicly apologize after all 
these years.9  The proof paradoxes were the grains of sand in the oyster that 
stimulated thought, to mix metaphors, but they were never the heart of the 
problem for precisely the reason just mentioned: features of the world will 
not be changed by changing our mental apparatus.  The significance of the 
proof paradoxes, in my opinion, lies solely in their opening up skepticism 
about whether a potentially powerful account of juridical proof with a 
probabilistic foundation was justifiable.  It turns out it was not, but again not 
just because of this feature of the world.  Any explanation of juridical proof 
must give an account of this aspect of the world to have any chance of 
success. 
Rather, the deeper problem is that no interpretation of probability 
makes much sense in the context of litigation.  Much of the literature just 
ignores this point, which makes that part of the literature completely 
uninteresting.10  Those who recognize the deep problem here branched into 
two directions, one explaining proof at trial as involving plausible reasoning 
(of which probability is a part)11 and the other embracing some form of 
subjective probability.12  The difficulty with the subjective probability move 
is that it is indeed subjective.  Subjective probability was not designed for 
and cannot easily accommodate truth conducive procedures; it was designed 
to elicit personal views and to maintain consistency among them.  It is true 
that if subjective views are systematically updated with data in the form of 
objective likelihoods, there are reasons to believe that the final conclusions 
of different decision makers will converge, and occasionally converge on the 
 
 9  It all started in 1986.  See Allen, supra note 4; see also Ronald J. Allen, Factual 
Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604, 604 (1994) (arguing that the 
“most damaging” proof paradox tending to undermine “the conventional [probabilistic] view” 
of burdens of proof is “the remarkable consequences of the conjunctive effect implicit in the 
conventional theory”).   
 10  Reading other people’s work, I have often thought that the authors of sentences like 
the one to which this footnote is attached should be required to give references, but at the 
moment I am happy to be relieved of such an obligation. 
 11  See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of 
Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557 (2013); Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and 
the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 223–68 (2008).   
 12  CLERMONT, supra note 8; NANCE, supra note 7.  An astonishing example of this is 
KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 483 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 6th ed. 
2006), where the authors claim that certain instructions are misleading because they “divert 
attention to the evidence,” whereas they should focus on the degree of the juror’s belief.  As 
Susan Haack pithily put it, “this has things exactly backwards.” SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE 
MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND TRUTH IN THE LAW 52 (2014).  
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truth;13 but objective data in this form is precisely what virtually never exists 
at trial and is the original cause of the failure of probabilistic explanations 
(supplemented with computational intractability, which again while true is 
not the central problem). 
This is what led scholars to explore other explanations, and as Clermont 
points out, the most durable of these has been relative plausibility.14  But 
relative plausibility is not simply an explanation of the burden of persuasion 
instructions; it is an explanation that encompasses the entire proof process.  
The American legal system, generally speaking: (1) encourages the 
presentation of competing explanations of the relevant events; (2) in civil 
cases, makes the evidence necessary to support those explanations available 
(and to some extent also in criminal cases); (3) provides liberal rules of 
admission to allow the parties to tailor their cases to their best advantage; 
and (4) encourages articulations by both parties of the theory of the case in 
pleadings, discovery, opening statements, and closing arguments.  Lawyers 
regularly describe their activity as showing that “their version of the case” is 
what happened,15 and courts routinely point out the obvious—that the 
“probability” of something happening depends on the alternatives.16 
This last point deserves some elaboration.  The central idea of relative 
plausibility is that fact finders employ their full panoply of cognitive tools, 
assisted by the parties, to judge which explanation or combination of 
explanations is the most plausible, and by doing so, to determine the most 
likely explanations of events.  So, at the end of the day, relative plausibility 
incorporates elements of probability explanations; errors are kept under 
control and allocated appropriately by deciding for the most plausible 
explanation or set of explanations in civil cases and deciding whether there 
are plausible stories of guilt and innocence in criminal cases.  The point, 
however, is that the judgment of plausibility is done using conventional 
cognitive tools such as appraisals of consistency, coverage, etc., and as I will 
 
 13  Allen, supra note 3; Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A 
Preliminary Inquiry, 1 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF (SPECIAL ISSUE) 254 (1997).  
 14  See CLERMONT, supra note 8.  
 15  A useful collection of such descriptions is the NAT’L ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEF. 
LAWYERS, POWERFUL WORDS: STORYTELLING & PERSUASION TECHNIQUES FOR 
COMMUNICATING YOUR THEORY OF THE DEFENSE (2016).  Virtually never is the “theory of the 
defense” that a discrete element is false.  It is rather that the defense “story” is inconsistent 
with guilt.  
 16  See, e.g., Anderson v. Griffin, 397 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Beard 354 F.3d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 2004).  In criminal cases, the issue is whether there is a 
plausible story of guilt and no plausible story of innocence.  See, e.g., United States v. Newell, 
239 F.3d 917, 920 (7th Cir. 2001).  The Supreme Court acknowledged the relative nature of 
proof in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 437–38 (2002) (finding 
that the City justified its statute restricting adult businesses, the Court said: “Neither the Court 
of Appeals, nor respondents, nor the dissent provides any reason to question the city’s theory.  
In particular, they do not offer a competing theory”).   
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turn to in a moment, Michael Risinger’s interesting suggestion of surprise—
but none of this can be done unless there are alternatives.  And the alternative 
in American litigation virtually never is that the plaintiff’s explanation is 
false.  Rather, the alternative is that the defendant’s explanation is true, and 
thus the plaintiff’s explanation is false.  Analytically this need not be true—
a point that Clermont exploits17—but practically it is.  Otherwise, plaintiffs 
would have to show half plus one of the ways the world could have been 
favor liability, or criminal defendants could defend successfully by bringing 
in the phone book or some other weird “contortion.”18  Observation shows 
those are not the world we actually live in. 
A few counter-examples can be given to the relative plausibility 
explanation.  Surely once in a while a defendant does little more than attempt 
to negate an element (and I predict they almost always lose), and 
occasionally there is substantial relative frequency data that permits 
probabilistic explanations to dominate.  But one should not ask too much of 
an explanation or theory in this context.  Both the legal system generally and 
the litigation process specifically are not top-down made systems 
explainable by simple propositions emanating from their creators.  Rather, 
they are bottom-up grown systems.  To use an image I frequently invoke, 
they are more like rain forests than tree farms.  They are complex adaptive 
systems, rather than simple static systems.19  There will always be counter-
examples to any explanation of such systems.  Thus, the important question 
is not whether any particular theory suffers from no counter-examples, but 
instead the extent to which it advances understanding.  On that score, all the 
recent writings on burdens of proof have their merits, although none of them 
has the explanatory force or scope of relative plausibility, in my humble 
opinion. 
Ironically, given the fascination with the conjunction effect and relative 
plausibility, the present instructions, which obviously focus the fact finder’s 
attention on each element,20 are at least superficially as much of a problem 
 
 17  This is what motivates his discussion of, and reliance on, belief functions.  CLERMONT, 
supra note 8, at 201.  
 18  Clermont tries to avoid this by suggesting that there is an unallocated belief between 
X and not-X, but he completely ignores where any belief in not-X comes from.  I suggest it 
typically comes from the defendant who provides evidence of Y, which entails not-X. 
 19  Ronald J. Allen, Rationality and the Taming of Complexity, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1047 
(2011). 
 20  This was systematically established in Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of 
Persuasion in Civil Cases: Algorithms v. Explanations, 4 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893 (2003).  
Professor Nance remains unconvinced, and recently reiterated that a number of pattern jury 
instructions are “consistent” with requiring findings of the conjunction of the elements.  
NANCE, supra note 7, at 76–77.  Michael S. Pardo and I in a forthcoming article, Relative 
Plausibility and Its Critics, systematically dismantle these types of assertions.  Just as one of 
many examples, when one looks at the actual instructions given in pertinent cases, one finds 
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for relative plausibility as any of these other attempts to explain juridical 
proof (I explain its resolution at the end of this essay).  That is why the 
analysis moved beyond them to embed them in their larger context.  They 
are, as it were, the odd man out.  There is simply an unavoidable tension 
between looking at elements discretely, if the question is the truth OR NOT 
of some element, and any sensible approach to burdens of persuasion.  Thus 
I tend to agree with Professor Dale A. Nance’s view that they express 
necessary but not sufficient conditions.21  What is sufficient, however, is not 
the conjunction of the elements.  That, too, suffers from debilitating 
problems.  Without knowing what the alternatives are, one cannot assign 
probability or anything else to an explanation except to say that it is plausible 
(or not) given the evidence.  And one can say that only because no alternative 
has been produced; there is thus one explanation backed by evidence, which 
must be the case, so far as anyone can tell, in the absence of any other.  One 
has to know what it is competing with, as the legal system recognizes over 
and over again, in order to know who wins.  If there is no competition, the 
one explanation standing, whether in civil or criminal cases, wins. 
Consequently, it is not quite accurate to assert that the relative 
plausibility theory “contort[s itself] in efforts to find ways to live with the 
law’s approach.”22  Instead, it points out how the American legal system 
evolved a means of controlling its consequences.  Rather than have fact 
finders focus on the elements OR NOT of a plaintiff’s case, regardless of 
what the instruction on the burden of persuasion actually says, the American 
legal system encourages the presentation of alternative explanations,23 which 
 
cases like In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, in which the Court of Appeals 
approved jury instructions and a special verdict form that had the effect of adopting the 
plaintiff’s requested instruction that: “If you find that the plaintiffs have established these two 
elements by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be for the plaintiffs.  If 
the plaintiffs have not established both elements, then your verdict must be for the 
defendants.”  In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 756 F.2d 411, 416 (5th Cir. 
1985).  The disagreement in the case was over the substantive law, not over whether findings 
of each element was sufficient for a verdict.  Id.   
 21  See, e.g., supra note 7, at 73074. 
 22  Clermont, supra note 5, at 2.   
 23  For some reason, the critics of the relative plausibility theory assert that it is committed 
to the story model of jury decision-making propounded by Pennington and Hastie.  See 
Clermont, supra note 5.  This is a peculiar assertion.  The work of Pennington and Hastie 
certainly supplies some empirical support for the relative plausibility explanation, as does the 
more important work of the Arizona Jury Project which finds that jurors attempt to construct 
the most plausible account of the litigated events.  See, e.g., Diamond, Murphy & Rose, supra 
note 2, at 1575.  “They actively search for ways to make sense of events about which they are 
told, consciously or unconsciously filling in blanks and resolving ambiguities to produce a 
plausible account and arrive at what they understand to be a just verdict consistent with the 
evidence and instructions.”  Id.  But explanations can come in many different forms.  If a 
party chooses to provide something other than a coherent chronological narrative, there is 
nothing that stops it from doing so, and nothing inconsistent in doing so with the relative 
ALLEN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2018  12:23 PM 
2018] THE DECLINING UTILITY 1001 
distributes the logical problems over both sides of the dispute.  This has been 
known for a long time.24  A more recent addendum to the explanation of 
juridical proof is the recognition of the massive overlapping of evidence that 
tends to occur at trial.  Most of what plaintiffs (including the state in criminal 
cases) and defendants assert is quite consistent, with the parties choosing to 
dispute only parts of the overall explanations.25  As the range of the dispute 
narrows, the logical problems diminish as well. 
Professor Risinger now adds to the literature a novel exegesis on 
burdens of persuasion that focuses on the surprise that a fact finder would 
feel if he or she learned that a mistake had been made.26  As with all of 
Professor Risinger’s writings, this is both insightful and provocative.  It is 
also his first foray into this particular territory, so far as I know, and not 
surprisingly the proposal is somewhat underdeveloped.  I thus commend its 
creativity and offer a few suggestions.27  First, although Professor Risinger 
wisely eschews conventional probability theory as a main component in his 
proposal, nonetheless at this stage in development it appears to bear some 
relationship to the proposals of the original creators of formalized subjective 
probability.  It is basically an algorithm for determining the extent of one’s 
commitments to certain propositions or drawing out one’s utility functions 
and preferences.  Leonard J. Savage, Bruno De Finetti, and others asked 
 
plausibility theory.  Whatever explanation is offered will be considered in light of its 
alternatives.  For a discussion of the differences between the story model and explanations, 
see Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L. REV. 547, 
598–99 (2013).  
Critics also consistently assert that the relative plausibility theory cannot accommodate 
intermediate standards of proof, such as clear and convincing evidence.  NANCE, supra note 
7, at 82 n.219.  This is an equally peculiar assertion.  It is equivalent to saying that human 
decision-making does not encompass the view that some explanations are much more 
plausible than others, or equivalently that without the apparatus of probability theory 
statements such as “I think it is much more likely to rain tomorrow than be sunny,” are 
meaningless.  Such statements lack the false precision of a probability statement, but they are 
perfectly comprehensible.  Indeed, one of the ironies of the probability debates is that critics, 
such as Professor Nance, who make such points never define what “clear and convincing” 
evidence is within their framework.  Or beyond reasonable doubt, either.  Again, the relative 
plausibility theory handles things naturally, or as Professor Clermont might say, with good 
common sense.  
 24  Allen, supra note 4, at 426.  
 25  Pardo, supra note 23, at 576–87.   
 26  Michael D. Risinger, Leveraging Surprise: What Standards of Proof Imply that We 
Want from Jurors, and What We Should Say to Them to Get It, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 965 
(2018).   
 27  My frequent co-author, Michael S. Pardo, provides a philosophically rich and 
interesting discussion of Risinger’s proposal and its relationship to relative plausibility, and 
so I content myself here with a few gap filling comments.  Michael S. Pardo, Epistemology, 
Psychology, and Standards of Proof: An Essay on Risinger’s “Surprise” Theory, 48 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1039 (2018).   
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different questions but they were put to similar purposes.28  The difference 
between the subjectivists and Shackle to some extent lies in the definiteness 
with which an answer must be given, but it is not clear to me how much of a 
difference that difference makes in the juridical context.  Asking people if 
they would be really surprised sounds similar to asking them if they would 
make a really big bet on the truth of some proposition.  One loses much of 
the ability to compute easily without cardinal answers, but you get the same 
basic output.  Or so it seems to me at the moment.  I look forward to further 
explication from Professor Risinger. 
The second point is perhaps more fundamental, and it is one that 
Professor Risinger alludes to but does not develop, and that is the ambiguous 
relationship between ex ante and ex post analysis.  Ex ante, the question fact 
finders face is whether a burden of persuasion has been satisfied, however 
that is accomplished.  In asking fact finders how surprised they would be to 
find out they were wrong, what ex post counter-factual worlds may be 
considered?  Whether some new evidence might appear?  Whether some 
probative evidence was excluded?  Whether witnesses lied?  Whether the 
government planted inculpatory evidence?  Whether the defendant murdered 
a potentially important witness?  I suspect, ex post, I would be very surprised 
by some outcomes, but not others.  How the surprise theory handles such 
matters needs to be developed. 
The nature of the case matters as well.  Suppose I am a juror in a 
criminal case and conclude (using relative plausibility) that there is a 
plausible case of guilt and none of innocence, although another juror thinks 
to the contrary.  Whatever the outcome of the case (however the initial 
disagreement was resolved), how surprised would I be that another 
reasonable person’s view of the evidence turned out to be a better appraisal 
of the situation than mine?  Not very, I would think, for these are ambiguous 
problems.  Map this onto Professor Risinger’s proposal directly.  Before 
deliberation, my view is that I would be very surprised if the defendant were 
innocent, and yours is that you would be very surprised that the defendant is 
 
 28  From ALAN HÁJEK, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY: INTERPRETATIONS 
OF PROBABILITY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2002), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-
interpret/#SubPro:   
 
Utilities (desirabilities) of outcomes, their probabilities, and rational 
preferences are all intimately linked. The Port Royal Logic (Arnauld, 
1662) showed how utilities and probabilities together determine 
rational preferences; de Finetti’s betting analysis derives probabilities 
from utilities and rational preferences; von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944) derive utilities from probabilities and rational preferences.  And 
most remarkably, Ramsey (1926) (and later, Savage 1954 and Jeffrey 
1966) derives both probabilities and utilities from rational preferences 
alone.   
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guilty.  Having deliberated on those views, I would not be very surprised at 
all if your view instead of mine were true, again because a reasonable person 
considering the same evidence as I did reached a different conclusion.  How 
does the surprise theory handle this? 
I encourage Professor Risinger to go more deeply into this interesting 
theory.  Like all good ideas first propounded, Professor Risinger’s is 
provocative but not necessarily complete, and I raise these points as 
hopefully helpful suggestions for developing it further.  I should also 
emphasize that Professor Risinger is not attempting to explain juridical 
proof, but, I believe, to improve on what he sees.  Part of the future 
development of the idea should include reasons to think fact finders would 
do better than they presently do by having this structure imposed upon them. 
Of the two recent major analyses of burdens of proof, I focus here on 
Professor Clermont’s analysis.29  Unlike Professor Risinger, Professor 
Clermont is quite sure that he has a better explanation than any of those that 
have been advanced to date about the nature of juridical proof, and Professor 
Nance is somewhat unclear whether he is focusing on explication or 
reform.30  By contrast, Professor Clermont is plainly working the same field 
that I am, and I appreciate his acknowledgement that my work is the 
“hardiest contortion”31 of the various corpuses on offer other than his.  Were 
my Mother here to guide me, she would tell me to accept the compliment, 
such as it is, sit down, and shut up.  Using Professor Risinger’s approach, 
she would not be surprised at my disregarding her sage advice. 
My view of the lay of the land is, not surprisingly, somewhat different 
from Professor Clermont’s.  Professor Clermont has produced a marvelous 
work of scholarship reflecting great, indeed astonishing erudition.32  I think 
he is plainly correct in parts of his project, but I do not think that he has 
drawn the correct inferences from his own research in other critical areas.  
We agree, for example, on the limited role of formal probability theory, and 
that proof at trial is largely comparative.  However, the sustained argument 
that fuzzy logic and set theory provide a solution to the conjunction paradox, 
or for that matter much help at all on questions of fact, are simply wrong.33  
 
 29  This part is indebted to Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo.  
 30  Like Professor Risinger, other recent writers are attempting to improve on the present 
situation.  I believe this is true of Dale Nance, and what he terms an “interpretive” approach. 
DALE A. NANCE, THE BURDENS OF PROOF: DISCRIMINATORY POWER, WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, 
AND THE TENACITY OF BELIEF 11 (2016).  I put these other efforts aside because of limited 
space here and because a systematic treatment is forthcoming from Allen & Pardo.   
 31  Clermont, supra note 5.   
 32  This is true of Professor Nance as well.  See, e.g., NANCE, supra note 30.   
 33  I should point out that in a series of emails in 2011, I put Professor Clermont on notice 
of the conceptual difficulties his proposal faced.  Email from Ronald J. Allen, John Henry 
Wigmore Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, to Professor Clermont, 
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Professor Michael Pardo and I are working on a systematic treatment of 
relative plausibility and its critics,34 and this discussion complements the one 
that we will provide there. 
I assume general awareness of fuzzy logic.  In brief, it was created to 
give a means to handle linguistic vagueness in computer programming, and 
in that it was quite successful.  It measures the extent to which a fact (John 
is five feet tall) “participates” in the (vague) set of “tall men.”  There can be 
more than one fuzzy set at play, and those sets can intersect, which is 
sometimes (but misleadingly) also referred to as the conjunction of the sets.  
The axiom of intersections of sets is that the “conjunction” of sets is equal to 
the lowest value of the sets involved.  Professor Clermont presents a 
sustained argument that juridical proof should be analyzed as though it 
primarily involved fuzzy sets so that the “conjunction” of two elements is 
the smallest of the pertinent variables, and thus, although “it may sound like 
magic,”35 the conjunction paradox disappears. 
The problem is that it does not for the reason that began this paper: the 
conjunction effect is a feature of the world, not of our logic or mathematics.  
It does not change as we embrace new or different ways of thinking.  This is 
powerfully illustrated by a hypothetical that Professor Clermont gives that is 
designed to clinch the case for fuzzy logic, but it has exactly the opposite 
effect.  According to Professor Clermont, the law “chooses” fuzzy logic over 
probability theory because it “behave[s] more appropriately than 
probabilities in a world filled with various kinds of uncertainty.36  Here is a 
last clever image to make the point as to what the law deals in: 
 
Suppose you had been in the desert for a week without drink and 
you came upon two bottles marked K and M [and marked, 
respectively, with a .91 membership in the fuzzy set of potable 
liquids and a .91 probability of being a potable liquid].  
Confronted with this pair of bottles, and given that you must drink 
from the one that you chose, which would you choose to drink 
from?  Most people, when presented with this experiment, 
immediately see that while K could contain, say, swamp water, it 
would not . . . contain liquids such as hydrochloric acid.  That is, 
membership of 0.91 means that the contents of K are fairly similar 
to perfectly potable liquids . . . . On the other hand, the probability 
that M is potable “equals 0.91” means that over a long run of 
experiments, the contents of M are expected to be potable in about 
 
Robert D. Ziff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School (Dec. 27, 2011) (on file with author).  I 
am now fleshing out the details of those points.   
 34  See Allen & Pardo, supra note 5.   
 35  Clermont, supra note 5, at 15. 
 36  Clermont, supra note 8, at 164–65. 
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91% of the trials.  In the other 9% the contents will be deadly—
about 1 chance in 10.  Thus, most subjects will opt for a chance to 
drink swamp water.37 
 
How does that map onto juridical proof?  For there to be any mapping 
requires either that in the typical case the evidence presented has both forms 
of information, or alternatively that one can change the real world by 
changing one’s commitments to various versions of set theory.  Let me give 
my own “clever image” to demonstrate the problem.  Suppose a Mr. Thomas 
Bayes, a good conventional probabilist, is lost in the desert and crawling in 
search of water.  He comes across a Clermont bottle marked with “Water 
0.91.”  He says to himself, “Oh, my God, there is a 9% chance that the bottle 
contains hydrochloric acid.  If I drink it, I will die!”  But, then he remembers 
that one class he had in Advance Probability Theory on fuzzy logic, and he 
says, “I swear allegiance to fuzzy logic, and therefore what is in the bottle 
participates in pure water to 0.91, and thus it is perfectly safe to drink.”  
Perhaps Professor Clermont disagrees, but I do not think this is how the 
world works.  Mr. Bayes, like the legal system, knows what he knows, and 
that is the end of the matter.  Maybe he knows (or believes, or whatever) that 
the bottle has a 91% chance of being water, and maybe he knows or believes 
it is 91% pure water, but whatever he knows will not change by switching 
mental gears lying there in the desert.  Nor, hopefully we all agree, will the 
contents of the bottle change based upon his methodological commitments. 
Now for a bit of the technical part.  Professor Clermont either thinks 
that the world will change because of our changing commitments to various 
analytical techniques (in this case probability theory v. fuzzy logic) or that 
such a change in commitment brings about a change in our knowledge of the 
world, but his argument containts two fundamental mistakes of mathematical 
logic that demonstrate that no such unsettling and magical phenomena are at 
play.  The first is that he has conflated (contorted, perhaps) the distinct ideas 
of probabilistic conjunction in mathematics and set intersection in set 
theory.38  The two ideas are just different, and there is no formalization that 
allows the one to be transposed into the other.39  A clue to this problem 
 
 37  CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 165–66 (quoting Bogdan R. Kosanovic, Fuzziness and 
Probability 2–3 (Feb. 8, 1995) (unpublished manuscript) (emphasis omitted)).   
 38  The contortion may stem from failing to keep distinct fuzzy logic, which employs the 
concepts of conjunction and disjunction, and fuzzy set theory, which employs the different 
concepts of intersection and union.  For a discussion, see Jørgen Harmse, Continuous Fuzzy 
Conjunctions and Disjunctions, 4 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON FUZZY SYSTEMS 295 (1996).  Just 
as a heads-up, logic and math (including set theory) have a complicated relationship.  ALFRED 
NORTH WHITEHEAD & BERTRAND RUSSELL, PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (1910 and subsequent 
editions).   
 39  As I discuss below, a particular problem may involve both uncertainy and vaguenss, 
and a fuzzy probability is being developed to apply in such cases.  However, this has nothing 
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should have been evident from the foundations of set theory.  Professor 
Clermont seems to think that “multivalent logic” has a different “rule” for 
intersection than bivalent logic that results in the radical difference in 
probabilistic conjunction.  As he says, “one must use multivalent logic, 
including its rule that conjoined likelihood equals the likelihood of the least 
likely element.”40  So far as I can tell, he derives this proposition from an 
axiom (not a derivation) of fuzzy set theory, which is, as Clermont points 
out, the MIN operator.41  The intersection of two sets is defined as φA∩B(x) 
= min(φA(x),φB(x)), where “φ” (phi) refers to the membership function that 
is necessary to define a fuzzy set.  The clue that there are difficulties here is 
that the analogous axiom in classical set theory can be expressed in 
essentially identical terms except for the one referring to a crisp set and the 
other to a fuzzy set.  One form of the definition of set intersection in crisp 
sets is μA∩B(x) = min(μA(x),μB(x)) where “μ” (mu) is the characteristic 
function of a classical set.42  Indeed, the general view, as Clermont notes, is 
that fuzzy set theory is a generalization of crisp set theory.  Rather than there 
being some fundamental differences in this respect, one is simply a special 
case of the other.  Rather obviously, the fact that classical set theory, like 
fuzzy set theory, defines the intersection of sets using the MIN rule does not 
warrant the conclusion that the probabilistic conjunction of two somewhat 
 
to do with what Clermont is proposing. 
 40  CLERMONT, supra note 8.   
 41  As Clermont points out, Cohen’s inductive logic has a similar rule.  See Clermont, 
supra note 5 (citing L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 89–91, 265–67 
(1977)).  His scheme, however, is quite idiosyncratic, and in addition the mathematics were 
never axiomatized.  Thus it provides no support for Clermont’s approach beyond another 
groundless assertion that the conjunction effect can be made to disappear.  Belief functions, 
by contrast, allow statements about sets of propositions, which gets nearer to Clermont’s 
ideas, but how they map onto the problem Clermont is addressing is unclear.  In addition, they 
are quite controversial epistemically, because they often lead to obviously wrong results.  See, 
e.g., Jean Dezert, Pei Wang & Albena Tchamova, On The Validity of Dempster-Shafer 
Theory, 15th INT’L CONF. ON INFO. FUSION 655 (2012); Lotfi A. Zadeh, A Simple View of the 
Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence and its Implication for the Rule of Combination, 7 AI 
MAGAZINE 85 (1986).  For a balanced review of belief functions that demonstrates their 
complexity done by a contractor of the United States Department of Energy, see KARL SENTZ 
& SCOTT FERSON, COMBINATION OF EVIDENCE IN DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY (2002), 
prod.sandia.gov/techlib/access-control.cgi/2002/020835.pdf.  See also Special Issue: The 
Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence, 18 INT’ J. INTELLIGENT SYS. 1 (2003).   
 42  For a discussion, see Thayer Watkins, Fuzzy Logic: The Logic of Fuzzy Sets, 6,  
http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/fuzzysets.htm.  See also Fuzzy Logic & Fuzzy Sets from 
the Instituto Superior Técnico, https://fenix.tecnico.ulisboa.pt/downloadFile
/3779578815313/CDI_SI_Fuzzy_Sets_2012.pdf.  The formulation in the text is the logical 
equivalent of the standard formulation of set intersection.  The difference is the standard 
formulation refers to the elements common to the sets whereas the logical equivalence refers 
to those elements that are not missing from each set.  The reformulation makes the connection 
between fuzzy and crisp sets clearer. 
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independent events is equal to the least likely of the events.43  Nor does it 
warrant that inference when dealing with fuzzy sets.  As I said at the 
beginning of this paragraph, the two concepts are just different and cannot 
be transposed one into the other.44 
The reason set theory defines intersection as it does is that it is a 
measure of the extent that sets have identical members rather than a measure 
of the probability within a defined probability space that one event or another 
will occur.  To make this clear, consider the following diagrams of (1) the 
set of prime numbers between 1–10; (2) the set of prime numbers between 
1–20; and (3) the set of prime numbers between 1–100.  Their intersection, 
or what Professor Clermont refers to as their conjunction, are the integers 
two, three, five, and seven.  Now ask a different question.  Suppose random 
draws are made from the set of integers 1–100.  What is the probability of a 
randomly drawn number being in one of the three original sets?  It obviously 











 43  In classic set theory the “min” rule identifies the elements that are members of both 
sets, whereas in fuzzy set theory the min rule identifies the extent to which a member 
participates in both sets and defines the intersection as the lower of the extent of participation 
in the two sets.  Although these are different, fuzzy sets are generally thought to be 
generalizations of classic sets.  See id.  In both classic and fuzzy sets, intersection is one thing 
and conjunction is another.  Clermont has simply conflated two different ideas.  See text infra 
n. 43. 
 44  In addition to not accommodating the differing foundations and set theory, Clermont 
seems to have ignored the foundations of mathematics as well.  At one point he suggests that 
“membership statements” within fuzzy logic can be meaningfully and easily multiplied to get 
comprehensible results.  CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 175.  Again, this is just wrong.  The 
“numbers” in fuzzy logic are not precise equivalents to numbers on the number line.  There 
is work being done now to define arithmetic operations on member statements, but these 
results bear no relationship to Professor Clermont’s discussion.  See, e.g., Yingxu Wang, On 
a Theory of Fuzzy Numbers and Fuzzy Arithmetic, in ADVANCES IN APPLIED AND PURE 
MATHEMATICS 82 (Jerzy Balicki ed., 2014); Md. Yasin Ali, Abeda Sultana & A F M 
Khodadad Khan, Comparison of Fuzzy Multiplication Operation on Triangular Fuzzy 
Number, 12 J. MATHEMATICS 35 (2016); Ch.-Ch. Chou, The Canonical Representation of 
Multiplication Operation on Triangular Fuzzy Numbers, 45 COMPUTERS & MATHEMATICS 
WITH APPLICATIONS 1601 (2003); Shang Gao & Zaiyue Zhang, Multiplication Operation on 
Fuzzy Numbers, 4 J. SOFTWARE 331 (2009).   
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It is critical to see the point here, and it is made evident by reconsidering 
my “clever image” above of the hypothetical Thomas Bayes.  Knowledge of 
uncertainty is simply different from knowledge of the extent of participation 
of an observation in a fuzzy set.  The one cannot be transmuted into the other 
by fiat, which is what Professor Clermont purports to do.  Correctly applying 
the logic of fuzzy sets, one can ask what is the intersection of the 
participation of each of these sets in “prime numbers” (admittedly not all that 
fuzzy of a concept, but remember that fuzzy sets are generalizations of crisp 
sets) and of course the answer is that which I gave above, which is the “MIN” 
value of 2, 3, 6, and 7.  And, as I discuss below, this tells you little or nothing 
about any probabilistic question, such as the probability of drawing such a 
number in a random draw from the three sets. 
There is actually a more serious problem with the analysis, and this is 
the second fundamental mistake of mathematical logic in Clermont’s 
argument.  It confuses membership statements with fuzzy sets, and in 
addition confuses fuzzy logic with fuzzy set theory.  Professor Clermont 
gives the following example of what he thinks shows the implications of 
fuzzy set intersection, but it shows no such thing: 
 
Begin with two membership statements . . . [that] Tom is a .30 
member of A [A=tallness] and a .40 member of B [B=smartness].  
Those numbers mean something like “Tom is not so tall” and 
“Tom is not so smart.” 
 
The fuzzy combination would yield:  “Because Tom is not so tall 
and Tom is not so smart, Tom is not such a tall, smart man,” 
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[which] . . . yields a .30 belief in that intersection.45 
 
It is true, as noted above, that the intersection of fuzzy sets is defined 
as he describes, but the definition of set intersection does not extend to 
membership statements, which are not sets(at least not in Clermont’s 
example; sets can have sets as members but this has nothing to do with his 
argument).  Just as in crisp set theory and logic, the definition of set 
intersection is one thing, the definition for the logical operators “and” and 
“or” is another. Fuzzy set intersection has nothing to do with the likelihood 
of two elements being true.  Rather: “In fuzzy sets, an element may partly 
belong to both sets with different memberships. A fuzzy intersection is the 
lower  membership in both sets of each element.”46  In Clermont’s example, 
on the basis of some observation,Tom may participate in one fuzzy set to .30 
and in another fuzzy set on the same observation to .40.  The intersection of 
these two fuzzy sets on that variable would be the “MIN” value of .30.  That 
is all there is to it. 
The most peculiar aspect of this example is that, rather than having to 
appraise the likelihood that Tom is not so tall and not so smart (“.30 belief 
in that intersection”), you know exactly how tall and smart Tom is.  That is 
what generated the member statements in tallness and smartness in the first 
place.  Whatever the membership function is, a certain height participates 
.30 in the fuzzy set of tallness and a certain intelligence participates .40 in 
the fuzzy set of smartness.  The fuzziness is in the set, and not in the 
membership statement.  That is probably why no person fluent in fuzzy set 
theory or logic, including the publications that he cites,47 embraces the thesis 
on offer, which I must confess looks like a “contortion” if ever there were 
one. 
 
 45  CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 175.   
 46  Siti Zaiton Mohd Hashim, Fuzzy Logic & Fuzzy Sets, at 32, 
https://comp.utm.my/sitizaiton/files/NotaSubjek/Nota%20%20AI%20(1)/Fuzzy1.pdf.  
 47  For example, Clermont relies on Timothy J. Ross and W. Jerry Parkinson, who have 
this to say about membership statements and fuzzy sets: 
 
Zadeh extended the notion of binary membership to accommodate 
various “degrees of membership” on the real continuous interval [0, 1], 
where the endpoints of 0 and 1 conform to no membership and full 
membership, respectively, just as the indicator function does for crisp 
sets, but where the infinite number of values in between the endpoints 
can represent various degrees of membership for an element x in some 
set in the universe. The sets in the universe X that can accommodate 
“degrees of membership” were termed by Zadeh as “fuzzy sets.” 
 
Timothy J. Ross and W. Jerry Parkinson, Fuzzy Set Theory, Fuzzy Logic, and Fuzzy Systems, 
in FUZZY LOGIC AND PROBABILITY APPLICATIONS: BRIDGING THE GAP 30 (Timothy J. Ross et 
al. eds., 2002).  See Clermont, supra note 5, at 15–16 n.46.   
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Indeed, quite at odds with the idea that one can just willy-nilly take the 
definition of the intersection of sets, apply it to membership statements, and, 
voila!, have a fuzzy theory of probability, those fluent in fuzzy set theory 
view the kind of example Clermont gives as a probabilistic problem.  It is 
perfectly coherent to formally analyze the relationship between fuzziness 
and probability, and today there are people working in the field to develop a 
fuzzy probability theory.  But that is not the hypothetical Clermont gives.  
There is no notion of probability at play; the notion at play is vagueness.  
You know Tom participates in the fuzzy sets of tallness and smartness and 
you know exactly the extent to which this is true. 
For what it is worth, the contours of the emerging area of fuzzy 
probability are quite different from Professor Clermont’s proposal, but they 
are exactly what one would predict.  As Michael Beer describes these efforts: 
 
Fuzzy probability theory is an extension of probability theory to 
dealing with mixed probabilistic/non-probabilistic uncertainty.  It 
provides a theoretical basis to model uncertainty which is only 
partly characterized by randomness and defies a pure probabilistic 
modeling with certainty due to a lack of trustworthiness or 




Fuzzy probability shares the common feature of all imprecise 
probability models: the uncertainty of an event is characterized 
with a set of possible measure values in terms of probability, or 
with bounds on probability.  Its distinctive feature is that set-
valued information, and hence the probability of associated 
events, is described with the aid of uncertain sets according to 
fuzzy set theory.  This represents a marriage between fuzzy 
methods and probabilistics with fuzziness and randomness as 
special cases, which justifies the denotation as fuzzy randomness.  
Fuzzy probability theory enables a consideration of a fuzzy set of 
possible probabilistic models over the range of imprecision of the 
knowledge about the underlying randomness.  The associated 
fuzzy probabilities provide weighted bounds on probability—the 




 48  Michael Beer, Fuzzy Probability Theory, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPLEXITY AND 
SYSTEMS SCIENCE 4047, 4048 (Robert A. Meyers ed., 2009), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-
387-30440-3.   
 49  Id. at 3049.   
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The progenitor of the field, Lotfi Zadeh, agrees.  Fuzzy logic does not 
permit conventional probability to be dispensed with by wishing away 
probabilistic effects50: 
 
Because it is possible that both uncertainty and imprecision can be 
present in the same problem, Zadeh (1995) has also claimed that 
“probability must be used in concert with fuzzy logic to enhance 
its effectiveness. In this perspective, probability theory and fuzzy 
logic are complementary rather than competitive.”51 
 
There are hints throughout Clermont’s complex discussion that he 
understands this, although there are stronger statements suggesting that his 
analysis somehow resolves or eliminates the conjunction paradox.52  On the 
one hand, if all he is saying is that there are typically both uncertainty and 
vagueness in legal decision-making, he would be right—”common sense” if 
ever there were any.  Perhaps handling the vagueness problem with some 
fuzzy set influenced methodology might be useful, but so far as I can tell, his 
work does not develop that idea, contenting itself with various claims of the 
advantages of fuzzy set theory as a substitute for probability theory.53  On 
the other hand, if he really believes that embracing fuzzy set theory actually 
eliminates the conjunction problem, he is simply wrong.  It remains, being 
as I have said a number of times, a feature of the world and not our 
characterization of the world. 
The examples that Professor Clermont gives of his proposal in action 
vividly highlight the contortions he is engaged in.  He is right that vagueness 
is a problem for legal language, but it does not translate into the superiority 
of fuzzy set theory quite as he suggests.  Repeatedly, Professor Clermont 
 
 50  Nozer D. Singpurwalla & Jane M. Booker, Membership Functions and Probability 
Measures of Fuzzy Sets, 99 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 867, 867 (2004) (quoting Lotfi A. Zadeh, 
Discussion: Probability Theory and Fuzzy Logic Are Complementary Rather Than 
Competitive, 37 TECHNOMETRICS, 271, 271–76 (1995)).   
 51  Id.  And again, the work that Singpurwalla cites agrees with this as well.  Ross & 
Parkinson, supra note 47, at 29.  Ross and Parkinson have this to say about fuzzy sets and 
probability: “To summarize, there is a clear distinction between fuzziness and randomness of 
an event.  Fuzziness describes the ambiguity of an event, whereas randomness describes the 
likelihood of occurrence of the event.”  Id. at 31.   
 52  In a startling disregard of mathematics, Prof. Clermont says this about his hypothetical 
involving fault and identity:  “While the MIN rule seems the obvious choice if identity is a 
matter of occurrence uncertainty and fault is a matter of imprecise vagueness, I think it should 
apply even if both factfinding percentages measure only random uncertainty.”  Clermont, 
supra note 8, at 178. 
 53  The decision theorist, David Schum, who has also an interest in legal evidence, 
explored precisely this relationship, reaching conclusions bearing no relationship to those of 
Professor Clermont.  See, e.g., DAVID A. SCHUM, THE EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
PROBABILISTIC REASONING 261–69 (1994).   
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gives examples of how standard factual uncertainty intersects with legal 
vagueness, and implicitly suggests that his examples are paradigmatic cases 
of legal decision making.  They are not, and the inference he draws from his 
examples is unjustified.  Imagine, he says: 
 
“a plaintiff trying to prove the identity of the perpetrator being 
Tom and also to prove the perpetrator being at fault.  True, if the 
randomized odds are 60% and 70%, the odds of Tom being at fault 
are 42%.  The product rule gives that result.  But if the plaintiff 
has proved fault to 70%, the odds on the remaining question of 
Tom being the perpetrator are 60%.  The MIN rule sets the 
likelihood of the conjunction at 60%.54 
 
Like Clermont, I also approve of this result, but note why.  The question of 
“fault” is a question of law: is what this person did within the meaning of 
“fault” for the purposes of the law?  Perhaps an act that “participates” 70% 
in a certain concept of fault is at fault within the meaning of the law, but if 
so that simply means what the person did is within the legal definition no 
matter how it matches up to some idealized extreme version of the term.  
Once that decision is made, it is made for all time (or at least until an 
authoritative decision maker changes the outcome).  Questions of “law” are 
indeed questions of “fact” but they have different consequences once the 
label is attached.  So, if there really were any cases like this, Professor 
Clermont would be right but for the wrong reason.  A legal conclusion is 
reached that what happened counts as fault, and now the only question is 
whether Tom is the perpetrator. 
But in fact, there are no legal cases like this.  “Fault” is not a free 
floating idea; with the possible exception of negligence, “fault” is composed 
of the sum total of what a person is alleged to have done.  A person is at 
“fault” if he breaches a valid contract, but the factual elements of contract 
breach still have to be proven.  A conclusion of “fault” might be reached in 
an intentional tort case after numerous facts about the event are decided, and 
so on.  After those facts are decided, a conclusion must be drawn as to 
whether they are “breach” or “intentional tort,” or whatever, but there again 
is the legal question lurking.  In any event, many causes of action have 
multiple factual elements, a point I presume no one will dispute.55  Even if 
in each case there is legal vagueness, there remains factual uncertainty, and 
 
 54  Clermont approved of this result.  Clermont, supra note 8, at 183.   
 55  Pick your favorite example.  Mine has long been theft, which is the taking and carrying 
away of the personal property of another with the intent to deprive the owner permanently.  
Hopefully, it will not be contested that the typical cause of action comprises multiple 
elements. 
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thus there remains the specter of probability theory.  Returning to the main 
theme of this short paper, that uncertainty is a feature of the world and will 
not go away by applying the apparatus that may be useful for deciding vague 
“legal” questions to the different task of deciding factual questions.  Mistakes 
will continue to accumulate as a function of mistakes on discrete factual 
elements, simple as that. 
In his most recent discussion of the topic, Clermont notes that his 
analysis has “unfortunately convinced virtually no one,” which for all the 
reasons above is not surprising.  To his credit, he remains undeterred and 
doubles down on the analysis.  Interestingly in doing so he digs his 
conceptual hole deeper but in a manner that points the way out of the morass.  
Clermont says: 
 
Using the MIN rule yields the most accurate story, indeed, the 
story more likely than all the other possible stories combined.  
That is, the conjoined story is as likely as the weakest element, 
which has already satisfied the standard of proof if each element 
is more likely true than false.  Moreover, the disjunction of the 
falsities that combines all other possible stories is only as likely as 
the most plausible of the falsities, which has already failed the 
standard of proof.56 
 
This is obviously false.  As patience is probably wearing thin, take a 
stylized example to make the point.  Suppose a cause of action has six 
independent elements and there is a two-to-one chance of each being true.  
According to Clermont, no collection of stories could possibly be more likely 
than this.  In fact, based on what you know and disregarding any ignorance 
and assuming independence, the probability of at least one other story being 
true is approximately 1-(2/3)5 = 0.87.  Knowledge of uncertainty simply 
cannot be transmuted into the different problem of vagueness, which in turn 
will straighten everything out.  For one last time, you know what you know 
with whatever implications it has. 
Interestingly, Clermont would be right, and it would get him out of a 
host of difficulties, if the fact finder is comparing the explanations on offer 
and concludes that with respect to every element the plaintiff’s overall 
explanation is superior to the defendant’s—in other words, more or less the 
relative plausibility theory. 
But wait!  That sounds like comparing conjunctions.  Now introduce 
the point that most proof at trial is massively overlapping, and the 
disagreements among explanations tend to focus on a limited set.  In such 
circumstances, the logical problem of conjunctions is considerably 
 
 56  Clermont, supra note 5, at 18.   
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diminished if not always entirely eliminated, and this is precisely how the 
legal system accommodates, domesticates, whatever, the burden of proof 
instructions, just as the relative plausibility theory explains.  The instructions 
do focus the fact finder’s attention on, in Professor Nance’s words, the 
necessary elements that an explanation must possess in order for a plaintiff 
to win,57 and the overall proof process encourages, if not requires, the parties 
to advance competing explanations.  This takes the probabilistic sting out of 
them.  Generally speaking, the result is, as I say, more or less what the 
relative plausibility theory predicts.58  If Clermont would drop his fallacious 
argument about the magical qualities of multivalent logic and set theory, we 
would welcome him into our camp. 
In any event, in my opinion, the fascination with burdens of proof 
played itself out.59  Explanations of juridical proof have to accommodate 
burden of proof instructions as they have to accommodate the reality of 
existence, but the compass of such explanations should be wider.  When one 
looks more generally, one sees very commonsensical practical reasoning 
that, in the real world, has no choice but to compare alternative explanations 
of uncertain events using a host of different cognitive tools.  The single-shot 
explanations of burdens of proof invariably miss the mark by failing to 
accommodate the complexity of the phenomenon under examination.  That 
is precisely what the relative plausibility explanation is attempting to do, and 
why Professor Clermont is right that it has resisted the efforts of its critics to 
lay it to rest.  I am also the person, however, who many years ago urged a 
young William Stuntz to get out of the field of constitutional criminal 
procedure because it kills brain cells.  He rather tellingly proved me wrong 
by being a part of a young cohort of scholars who revitalized the field.  
Maybe what appears obvious to me now will likewise prove wrong.  If so, I 
will be content to have been part of that sand in the oyster. 
 
 
 57  Dale A. Nance, A Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a Mathematical 
Interpretation of the Logic of Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 947, 948–52 (1986). 
 58  Out of perhaps an excess of caution, note that I say “more or less” in the text.  It is 
obvious that the legal system does not require a comparison of each of the plaintiff’s elements 
to each of the defendant’.  Nonetheless, this would approximate what that legal system 
actually does in many cases because of the massive overlap of evidence.  Clermont and others 
assert that a shortcoming of relative plausibility is that the “law” does not require defendants 
to offer a competing explanation.  What they mean is that the instructions on the burden of 
proof do not so require, but much of the surrounding procedural context strongly encourages 
precisely that.  In addition, the critics never address the likelihood of a defendant winning 
who has not produced a counter-explanation.  In the rare case in which that happens, I predict 
convictions and holdings of liability will predominate, which casual empiricism confirms.  
Perhaps one source of apparent disagreement is differences in what various analysts are 
analyzing.  Relative plausibility is not just an explanation of the instructions of burdens of 
persuasion, although it accommodates them reasonably well. 
 59  Even though I can’t stop writing about them.  My apologies again. 
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To return, finally, to the question I was supposed to address, I have no 
good reason to think that fact finders are not doing a pretty good job at what 
we want them to do.  Of course there are erroneous and peculiar outcomes, 
but there are massive numbers of cases and in any human institution things 
are going to go wrong.  I suspect a bigger problem would be well-intentioned 
but fundamentally unjustified modifications of methods that turn out to have 
unintended consequences.  Indeed, you might even think that captures a fair 
amount of the rules of evidence.  My advice—were I forced to give it—
would be to look for ways to enhance the practical reasoning of fact finders 
rather than obstruct it.  A good example of this is the gradual evolution of 
the hearsay rule from a rule of exclusion to a rule of admission.60  A terrible 
example is the Crawford line of cases that retards reliable decision making 
for the flimsiest of reasons.61  It seems like the professionals—the judges, 
lawyers, and law professors—cannot stop trying to get fact finders to do what 
we want them to do, rather than letting them do their job. 
 
 
 60  Ronald J. Allen, The Hearsay Rule as a Rule of Admission Revisited, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1395 (2016). 
 61  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  For an example of the problems caused 
by Crawford, see Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) 
